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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

>

Case No.
11028

LLOYD STANGER and EDNA
OLSON STANGER, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
THE CASES CITED IN RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF SUPPORT APPELLANTS' CLAIM
THAT THEIR PROPERTIES HAVE SUST A I NE D COMPENSABLE SEVERANCE
DAMAGES.
In its brief (pp. 2 & 3) the State Road Commission
argues that the trial judge was clearly correct in his
1

comments and instructions to the jury concerning
severance damages. Specifically, the respondent refers
to Instruction No. 7 as requiring that severance damage, in order to be compensable, " ... not be entirely
due to the project's presence in the general area; ... "
(Ephasis added). In other words, the respondent
argues that the jury was called upon to separate noncompensable damages from compensable damages. The
respondent then equates noncompensable damages with
the infringement of the rights of access, light, air, view,
drainage and privacy.
The errors in respondent's argument will be pointed
out infra, but first it must be made clear that Instruction No. 7 was more sweeping than the respondent
represents. In fact, Instruction No. 7 required that severance damage, in order to be compensable, not be " ...
in part, or entirely, because of the projects (project's)
presents (presence) in the general area independant
(independent) of this taking ... " (Emphasis added).
In other words, the court effectively precluded the jury
from even considering those damages which the State
of Utah claimed to be noncompensable by requiring
that no segment or part of the damage suffered by
the appellants be shared in common with their neighbors. The trial judge would have saved time in obtaining the result he did by granting the respondent's Mo·
tion for Directed Verdict instead of reserving the ruling.
As previously indicated, the respondent argued
m its brief that, in arriving at severance damages, a
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distinction must be drawn between compensable and
noncompensable damages. In defining the line of demarcation between the two, the respondent cites (p. 4)
State Road Commission v. Fourth District Court, 94
Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1937), for the proposition
that compensable damages are those which are actionable. The quotation furnished by respondent from the
Fourth District case is abstract in form, posing the
question, but not giving the answer. Ironically, the
answer can be obtained from a careful study of the
cases cited by respondent in its own brief.
Before making an analysis of the authorities cited
by respondent, it would be well to place those cases in
their proper perspective. In doing so the distinction
recognized by Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, between damage to a parcel, part of which is
taken, and damage to a parcel, though no part thereof
is taken, must be given at least some significance. The
significance of this distinction was pointed out in Rose
v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505 (1942), a case
which respondent cited in its brief and in which the
court held that where the necessity for assessing damages to private property arose apart from any taking of
property, the problem of limiting the landowner's recovery to items for which he is legally entitled to recover
damages becomes more acute.
The cases cited by the respondent deal, for the most
part, with factual situations where there was no actual
taking of real property. Many of these cases are con-

3

cerned with damages which all courts have agreed are
noncompensable; namely, diversion of traffic, creation
of cul-de-sacs involving no taking, and the separation of
traffic lanes by construction of medians.
The respondent argues that this distinction is not
a viable one, particularly where only a sliver of land
is taken. The respondent argues that " . . . (b) oth
types of situations should be treated equally, . . . "
(p. 4). However, respondent feels it more fair and
equitable to recognize the damage, but to declare it noncompensable in an effort to establish equality than to
compensate for all damage.
Looking now to those specific cases cited by the
respondent, it can be seen that other courts, and in fact
this very Court, have seen fit to compensate a landowner
though no part of his property has suffered a physical
taking. Furthermore, the question of, What constitutes
actionable damage?, can be answered.
The case quoted most extensively by the respondent
was the case of Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d
505 (1942). It will be noted that the quotation (p. 6)
is replete with reference to the noncompensability of
damages caused by a diversion of traffic. The appellants
have no quarrel with the quotation so long as it is limited
to the facts of that case and is applied, as the California
court intended, to the element of damage caused by a
diversion of traffic.
The Rose case concerned an action by Rose and
others to recover damages caused by the building of
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an underpass in the street in front of their properties.
Rose's land consisted of a total of 3.05 acres zoned
industrial but devoted to a fruit orchard with residence,
barn, tankhouse and windmill. The plaintiff's property
was adjacent to the railroad tracks. The underpass
was constructed in front of the plaintiff's property in
a street which was originally 66 feet wide. The underpass was 16.5 feet deep and 24 feet wide. On each side
of the underpass were 14.5 foot wide cul-de-sacs. There
was absolutely no physical taking of land owned by
plaintiff.
The court considered the case as presenting two
major questions: (1) Whether Section 14 of Article
I of the California constitution was self-executing, and
( 2) Whether the plaintiff suffered a compensable damage within the meaning of the constitution.
The court held that by the words, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made . . . ",
an inverse condemnation case could be brought against
the state. The constitutional provision was self-executmg.
In affirming the trial judge's holding that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, the court said on
page 514:
"That the owner of property fronting upon
a street or highway has as appurtenant thereto
certain private easements in the street in front
of or adjacent to the lot-distinguished from
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the public easements therein-which are a part
and portion of his property and are the private
property of the lot owner as fully as the lot itself,
is not open fo question."
The court then quoted with approval another California case on page 514, as follows:
"The property which an abutting owner has m
the street in front of his land is the right of
access and of light and air, and for an infringement of these rights he is entitled to compensation. This right is peculiar and individual to the
abutting owner, differing from the right of passing to and fro upon the street, which he enjoys
in common with the public, and any infringement thereof gives him a right of action."
The court specifically held that the doctrine of
damnum absque injuria had no application where the
person suffering the damage had a property right, :
the right of access in that case. The trial judge was Uf
held in finding that the plaintiff's easement of acces~
or right of ingress or egress was substantially impaired
by the construction of the subway. Denials of damage;
on the basis that they occurred through an exercise of
the police power was ruled out since police power involved "regulation" and no regulation was there present.
Instead, the case was said to be the result of a public
improvement constructed by the state in its exercise of
the power of eminent domain. The case was contrasted
with cul-de-sac cases on the basis that in those cases
there was no impairment of access, as here.
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The State Road Commission also cited (p. 8) the
case of State Highway Commission v. Silva, 71 N. M.
350, 378 P. 2d 595 (1962), for the application of the
doctrine of damnum absque injuria. The respondent's
brief did not, however, make clear that" . . . (t) he real cause of the depreciation in
value of their property by reason of the highway
improvement is the diversion of traffic from U.S.
85 to the new interstate highway." (378 P.2d
595, 596).
The Silva case is concerned with the diversion of
traffic from the landowners' bar by the creation of a
cul-de-sac. The second paragraph of the opinion 'says,
on page 596:

r:s

"It should be noted that none of defendants'
property was appropriated, nor was there any
change of grade on the road in front of their
property."

Respondent represents in its brief (p. 3) that
ipringville Banking Company v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d
·?JO, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), is authority for the propo:)ton that certain damages are noncompensable whether
~1ere is no taking or whether there is a "tiny taking".
'l'he Springville Banking case was concerned with a
rnedian to divide traffic lanes. There was no physical
tlking in that case nor is there reference to such.
11.

·"The State Road Commission cites Annotation, 22
A.L.R. 145, 148 (1923), at which point the Annotation
makes reference to the Georgia case of Austin v.
f;
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Augusta Terminal R. Co., 108 Ga. 671, 34 S.E. 852
( 1899). The Annotation is entitled, "Right of abutting
owner to compensation for railroad in street under constitutional provision against damaging property for
public use without compensation." For clarity the
Annotation is arranged in outline form. Under II (a)
the Annotation refers generally to the divergency of
court opinions, pointing out that there exists a strict
construction and a liberal construction. Under II (b)
the annotation cites those cases strictly construing the
constructional provision, including the Austin case
referred to in respondent's brief. Under II (c) the
annotation cites those cases liberally construing these
constitutional provisions, including the Utah case of
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 28 Utah
201, 77 Pac. 849 ( 1904). Further on the Annotation
discusses specific injuries which are either compensable
or noncompensable. Under III ( d) (2), regarding
interference with access by changing grade, the Annotation says on page 171:
"The cases uniformly hold that if the grade
of a street is changed by a cut, or embankment,
or a viaduct, so as to interfere with the abutting
owner's ingress and egress, he is entitled to damages. "
The respondent's brief does cite the Stockdale case
( p. 7) but only to quote the court's limitation to the
doctrine which it had previously announced and which
had controlled the case. In restraining the defendant
from operating cars over a railway track adjacent to
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the plaintiff's premises, this Court quoted 1 Lewis on
Eminent Domain ( 2 d Ed) Sec. 57, to this effect:
" ... And the great weight of the more recent
judicial authority, which we believe to be supported by the better reason, and which is more
in accord with our ideas of equity and natural
justice, holds that any substantial interference
with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's
right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in fact
and in law, a taking, in the constitutional sense,
to the extent of the damages suffered, even
though the title and possession of the owner remain undisturbed."
The Stockdale case is consistent with the case of
Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company, 9
Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229 (1893), which was cited by respondent (p. 13) and by appellants (p. 32) in their original brief. In that case the railroad company was prohibited from constructing a third set of tracks in the
street in front of the plaintiffs' homes. This court, in the
words of respondent, " ... recognized that the abutting
property owner could recover for an established right of
easement . . . " In that case the established right oi
easement was had by the abutting property owner over
the street which was held in fee by Salt Lake City. In
the case at bar the established right of "easement" is
over the street which is actually owned in fee by the
appellants! As shown by its Complaint (R. 1) the respondent is acquiring fee title to 0.89 acre of land,
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0.66 acre of which is within the north half of Seventh

Street.
Coming back to the case of State Road Commission
v. Jlourth District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502
( 1937) , a quota tion therefrom is found on page 16 of
respondent's brief. The respondent quotes that"In some jurisdictions . . . there must be a
taking of property . . . "
What the respondent doesn't report is that this Court
specifically held in the Fourth District case on page
508 that reference to damaged property in the Utah
constitution was intended to put an end to controversy " . . . and to protect the damaged property
owner equally with the property owner whose land was
physically entered upon."
On page 3 of Respondent's Brief the following
interesting statement appears:
" ... It is the jury's duty to separate noncompensable damagfs from compensable damages and allow only the constitutional 'just
compensation' to the condemnee."

Appellants take issue with the foregoing statement
and affirmatively counter with the claim that it is not
the jury's duty to separate compensable from noncompensable damages; rather, it is the province of the
Court during the course of trial to exclude evidence
of damages relating to noncompensable items. To
illustrate how this works in actual practice, the case of
Utah Road Com1nission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383
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P. 2d 917 (1963), which was apparently cited by
respondent in support of the fore going quotation, illustrates the practical workings relative to the problem.
In the Hansen case the property owner attempted
to introduce evidence in support of damages relating
to the cost of removing several hundred wrecked automobiles from his premises, business losses due to a premature sale of approximately 180 of such automobiles,
and a separate item of damages resulting from a loss of
access to a portion of his properties. As to these separate
claimed items of damage the trial court excluded evidence of such items since, under the circumstances of
the case and the applicable law, the item,s were noncompensable or included within the general measure
of damages. As for the cost of removing the automobiles
and the business losses, such items were not compensable because they were outside the rule of recovery
in eminent domain cases; accordingly, the Court properly excluded them. The Court further excluded evidence relative to a special amount to be designated for
"loss of access" since that figure was an element which
went into the general amount of damages to be awarded.
In fact, the Court properly pointed out that the measure
of damages to the real properties involved which were
not taken was the " . . . difference in the value of the
remaining tract before and after the taking."
Appellants submit that the province of the Court
is to rule as to whether specific claimed item~ of damage
are compensable or noncompensable, and that it is the
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province of the jury to weigh the offered and admitted
evidence in arriving at its decision. In no case which
has ever come to the attention of this writer has an
attempt been made, such as here, to suggest that it
is the province of the jury to make a legal determination
of what items of damage are compensable as distinguished from those which are noncompensable. The
jury tries facts-not law.

CONCLUSION
From the foregoing argument it should be clear
that the delineation of actionable damages to private
property-though no part thereof is taken (U. C. A.
Sec. 78-34-10 (3)), is more acute than the delineation
of actionable damages to remaining private propertya part of which is taken (U. C. A. Sec. 78-34-10 (2)).
It should also be abundantly clear that an infringement
of the rights of access, light, air, view, drainage and
privacy are compensable under the respondent's demarcation at the point of actionable damages. If any
more clarity is desired the same can be obtained from
Justice Wade's concurring opinion in Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District v. Gailey, 5 Utah 2d 385,
303 P. 2d 271, 274 (1963):
"On the question of what constitutes a taking
or damaging of private property for public use
we have held that a change in the grade of an
adjoining highway and the building of a viaduct
in the adjoining street inflicted compensable
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damages to the property of the adjoining landowner. Clearly, if such cases caused actionable
damage to the adjoining property . . . (then
actionable damage is here present)". (Emphasis
added).
Respectfully submitted,
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Defendants
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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